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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the emergence in the financial literature of a sophisticated
theory of risk measures, as a means for determining capital requirements for the holders
of risky portfolios. A landmark in this development has been the axiomatic definition of
coherent risk measures by Arztner et al. (1999), which has by now achieved the status
of a classic. However, the functional forms and fundamental properties of risk measures
have been extensively studied in the actuarial literature for more than thirty years, in the
guise of premium calculation principles (e.g. Bu¨hlmann (1970), Goovaerts et al. (1984)).
A specific class of coherent risk measures, termed distortion premium principles, were
introduced in an insurance pricing context by Denneberg (1990) and Wang (1996).
There are two alternative ways of defining (classes of) risk measures. One is to start
with a set of desirable properties that risk measures should satisfy and then determine
mathematically their corresponding functional representations. Artzner et al. (1999)
propagated such an axiomatic approach. The second way, often encountered in the
actuarial literature, is to determine the functional form of risk measures via economic
indifference arguments. The zero-utility premium principle was defined by Bu¨hlmann
(1970) by considering an insurer whose preferences are characterised by expected utility
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). Furthermore it can be shown that the distortion
risk measures proposed by Denneberg (1990) and Wang (1996) can also be obtained via
indifference arguments, based on Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice, which was proposed
as a complementary approach to expected utility.
Our aim in this paper is to associate these two approaches of defining risk measures,
by discussing the sets of properties that risk measures, derived via alternative economic
theories of choice, are characterised by and vice versa. We believe that the simultaneous
study of sets of properties and corresponding economic theories is illuminating in both
directions. On the one hand, it sheds light on the implicit economic assumptions behind
the choice of a specific risk measure, while on the other, it studies the explicit conse-
quences of decision making with a specific theory of choice. As an example of such an
interaction between axiomatic definition and economic theory, we note the recent discus-
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sion of the appropriateness of coherent measures of risk for setting capital requirements.
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002a), observed that the positive homogeneity and subadditivity
properties of coherent risk measures make them insensitive to liquidity risk. Meanwhile
Dhaene et al. (2003) phrased a similar criticism, pointing out the incompatibility of co-
herent risk measures with expected utility theory. They proposed instead the use of the
exponential premium principle which is derived from an exponential utility function and
has an additional justification originating in actuarial ruin theory.
Our view is that both the (coherent) distortion risk measures, which are compatible
with the dual theory of choice, and risk measures derived from expected utility, such as
the exponential premium principle, are not completely satisfactory. Our criticism lies
both in terms of their corresponding sets of properties and of the accuracy with which
they describe economic agents’ preferences. We propose a class of risk measures based on
generalised expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1993), which is a combination of expected
utility and the dual theory of choice and provides a better characterisation of individual
preferences. Using an exponential utility function and an arbitrary probability distor-
tion function we define a risk measure which we call the distortion-exponential premium
principle. The properties of this risk measure lie in between those of the distortion and
the exponential premium principles. We provide numerical illustrations of the proposed
risk measure’s properties, which show that for relatively small portfolios of risks it be-
haves approximately like a coherent risk measure, whereas for larger portfolios, for which
liquidity and risk aggregation becomes an issue, it inherits properties of the exponential
premium principle.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section , we give a brief exposition of alter-
native characterisations of economic agents’ preferences, namely expected utility theory,
the dual theory of choice under risk, and generalised expected utility. In section 3 we
define risk measures and discuss alternative sets of properties that they should obey.
Subsequently, we proceed in section 4 with the definition of risk measures via indiffer-
ence arguments for the three theories of choice that were presented earlier and discuss
their respective properties. In section 5 we define the distortion-exponential principle
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and compare its basic properties to those of distortion risk measures and the exponential
premium principle. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 6.
2 Choice under risk
2.1 Preference operators and functionals
Suppose that an economic agent (e.g. an insurance company) is exposed to a risk X ∈ X ,
where X is a random variable representing (the payoff from) a portfolio and X is the set
of available portfolios that the agent may hold. The agent will prefer some elements of
X to others. We characterise the agent’s preferences via the binary operator ‘º’, where
X º Y for X,Y ∈ X is understood as meaning ‘portfolio X is at least as preferable
as portfolio Y ’. Given that the operator ‘º’ has some reasonable properties (see the
Appendix A for details), we can use it to order all portfolios with random payoffs in X
with respect to how desirable they are to the agent.
In order to be able to carry out such an ordering of risky portfolios in practice, it is
useful to associate the preference relation ‘º’ with a real-valued function V , defined on
X via:
X º Y ⇔ V (X) ≥ V (Y ) for X,Y ∈ X (1)
V is called the preference functional associated with ‘º’. The exact form of V will
depend on the assumptions that we make for the general properties of the preference
operator ‘º’; different assumptions lead to different representations in terms of V . In
this section we will discuss three cases: expected utility theory, based on the work of von
Neuman and Morgenstern (1947), the dual theory of choice developed by Yaari (1987),
and the generalised or rank-dependent utility framework, which is a synthesis of the two
previous approaches (Schmeidler (1989), Quiggin (1993)). Conditions under which each
theory emerges are discussed in more detail in Appendix A, while a table summarising
alternative characterisations of preferences can be found in Appendix B.
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2.2 Risk aversion and second stochastic dominance
Economic theories of choice provide formal ways in which to characterise agents’ be-
haviour, which often is risk averse. Risk aversion is a standard assumption in the lit-
erature, while being also widely observed in the practice of economic decision making.
One prominent example is the buying of insurance by an individual at a higher cost than
the expected loss that the individual faces. Formally, an agent is risk averse if he always
prefers a deterministic portfolio R to a random one X, with expected value E[X] = R
(if the reverse is true, the agent is called risk seeking):
E[X] º X ⇔ V (E[X]) ≥ V (X) ∀X ∈ X (2)
A more sophisticated characterisation of risk aversion is via the concept of second order
stochastic dominance. Stochastic dominance provides a way of ordering risky portfolios in
terms of their risk characteristics. Let X,Y ∈ X be two portfolios that we wish to compare
and SX , SY their respective survival functions. We say that X second stochastically
dominates Y and write X º2nd Y , if:∫ ∞
x
SY (t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
x
SX(t)dt for all x ∈ R, (3)
with the inequality being strict for some x ∈ R. The above equations have the interpre-
tation that, if portfolio X second stochastically dominates Y , the expected profit from
X in excess of any level x is higher than the expected profit from Y .
It is desirable that a preference relation is consistent with second stochastic domi-
nance. We say that a preference operator ‘º’ preserves second stochastic dominance,
whenever:
X º2nd Y ⇒ V (X) ≥ V (Y ) (4)
2.3 Expected utility theory
The first approach to modelling preferences on a collection of risky portfolios that we
discuss here is expected utility theory. This theory was introduced in the classic book by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and developed further by several authors. The
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intellectual roots of utility theory are however earlier and date back to the 18th century
and the work of the mathematician Daniel Bernoulli. Expected utility theory, despite its
drawbacks that will be discussed later, is the framework most widely used by economists
for modelling the preferences of economic agents.
We define expected utility as a preference functional U : X 7→ R of the form:
U(X) = E[u(X)] =
∫ +∞
−∞
u(x)dFX(x), (5)
where E[·] is the mathematical expectation operator, FX is the cumulative probability
distribution of X, and u is a real valued increasing function, called a utility function. The
utility function u can be interpreted as a non-linear transformation of the agent’s wealth,
that produces a mechanism for assigning a different weight to each outcome of X. The
fact that we require the utility function to be increasing is simply a consequence of the
fact that any reasonable agent would prefer more rather than less money (this simple but
important property is usually referred to as ‘increasing preferences’).
Given that an agent’s preferences are consistent with expected utility theory, a utility
function u will exist, such that the agent’s preferences are characterised by the expected
utility functional U(X) = E[u(X)], in the sense of equation (5). Furthermore this utility
function will be unique up to an affine transformation, i.e. if the utility function u
characterises the agent’s preferences, so does the function au(·) + b, where a > 0.
Utility functions have proved very useful for modelling the risk aversion of economic
agents. Characterisation of risk aversion via utility functions turns out to be very simple.
In the framework of expected utility, risk aversion is equivalent to requiring:
E[u(X)] ≤ u(E[X]) (6)
By Jensen’s inequality we have that:
E[u(X)] ≤ u(E[X]) ∀X ∈ X ⇔ u is a concave function. (7)
The concavity of the utility function represents ‘diminishing marginal returns’, in the
sense that, as the risk averse agent’s wealth increases, the additional benefit is smaller
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than the one obtained by the previous unit of wealth. In the context of choosing between
risky positions this property can be interpreted as follows. A risk averse agent with
initial wealth w is offered a fair bet: a coin is tossed and if the outcome is heads the
agent receives an amount a, while if tails is the outcome the agent has to pay a. The
expected value of the bet is zero, so if the agent is risk averse he will not accept the
bet. In terms of a concave utility function, an increase of wealth by a produces a lower
increase in the agent’s utility than the decrease caused by loosing a, and the bet thus is
unfavourable.
The concavity of the utility function is also a condition for preservation of second
stochastic dominance. In fact, it can be shown that X second stochastically dominates
Y if and only if it is E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for all concave utility functions (Quiggin, 1993).
It is apparent that risk aversion is closely related to the concavity of the utility func-
tion. It would be desirable to quantify this relationship and define a corresponding
measure of risk aversion. Assuming that the utility function is twice differentiable, a sen-
sible measure of risk aversion is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient (risk
aversion coefficient for short):
ra(w) = −
u′′(w)
u′(w)
(8)
Since the utility function is increasing by definition, is is obvious that the risk aversion is
positive if and only if the utility function is concave, equivalently the agent is risk averse.
The division by the first derivative of u is carried out in order to ensure that the risk
aversion is invariant under affine transformations of the utility function. Note that given a
risk aversion coefficient ra(w), and subject to a normalisation (e.g. u(0) = 0, u′(0) = 1),
the corresponding utility function can be uniquely determined by solving the differential
equation (8).
In some cases an agent might actually be risk seeking. In such a case he will always
prefer a risky position with mean R to a safe one equal to R, the corresponding utility
function will be convex, and the risk aversion coefficient will be negative.
It can be seen that risk aversion is, in general, a function of the agent’s wealth. Thus
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risk aversion can be decreasing in wealth as for a logarithmic utility function:
u(w) = ln w ⇒ ra(w) =
1
w
(9)
or increasing in wealth as for a quadratic utility:
u(w) = w −
1
2c
w2 (c > 0, w ≤ c) ⇒ ra(w) =
1
c− w
. (10)
A very important case is the one of exponential utility, which exhibits constant risk
aversion:
u(w) =
1
a
(1− e−aw) ⇒ ra(w) = a (11)
Exponential utility functions are widely used in applications, the main reason being
that the assumption of constant risk aversion often yields explicit solutions to otherwise
untractable mathematical problems. The independence of risk aversion from wealth is
particularly appealing as in many cases the initial wealth of an economic agent is not
known.
2.4 The dual theory of choice under risk
Even though the axioms on which utility theory is built are generally accepted as being
reasonable, violations of utility theory often take place in practice. These violations
manifest themselves in the famous Elsberg and Allais paradoxes (e.g. Quiggin, 1993). A
fairly common violation of expected utility occurs when an individual simultaneously buys
insurance (risk averse behaviour) and plays the lottery (which constitutes risk seeking
behaviour since the odds are always against the player). In general, there is empirical
evidence that agents tend in their economic decision-making to overstate the probabilities
of extreme events, both of adverse (such as having a serious accident) and of favourable
ones (such as winning the lottery) (Quiggin, 1993).
Attempts to address these problems of utility theory have been made by several au-
thors, including Quiggin (1982) and Machina (1982). In terms of the axiomatic foun-
dations of alternative theories of choice, the point of contention has in general been the
‘independence axiom’ of expected utility theory, which has been substituted by alternative
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formulations or dropped altogether (Puppe (1991), Quiggin (1993)), see the Appendix A.
Here we briefly discuss Yaari’s (1987) ‘dual theory of choice under risk’, which was de-
veloped as a complementary approach to expected utility theory. Yaari’s theory resolves
some of the paradoxes created by expected utility, while creating others of its own.
Yaari (1987) proposes the following preference functional:
H(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h(SX(x))− 1)dx +
∫ ∞
0
h(SX(x))dx, (12)
where SX(x) = 1−FX(x) = P(X > x) is the decumulative probability distribution func-
tion (survival function) of X, while h : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is an increasing function satisfying
h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1, which we will call a probability distortion function. Without loss
of generality, let us for simplicity assume that X ≥ 0, such that:
H(X) =
∫ ∞
0
h(SX(x))dx. (13)
Observe that the mean of X can be written as:
E[X] =
∫ ∞
0
SX(x)dx (14)
Also observe that the function h(SX(x)) is itself a decumulative distribution, though
different than the original one. Thus, from equation (13) it can be seen that the effect
of the probability distortion h is to modify (‘distort’) the probability distribution of the
random portfolio. The preference functional is the expected value of the portfolio with
respect to the modified distribution function. In expected utility theory the preference
functional is given as the expected value of a non-linear transformation of wealth; in the
dual theory it is the expected value of wealth under a non-linear transformation of the
probability distribution.
Similarly to the case of expected utility theory, risk aversion can be simply charac-
terised in terms of the distortion function. It follows from equations (14), (13) that an
agent is risk averse if and only if his distortion function is always below the line h(s) = s:
H(X) ≤ E[X] = H(E[X]) ∀X ∈ X ⇔ h(s) ≤ s ∀s ∈ [0, 1]. (15)
Risk Measures and Theories of Choice 10
However, for the agent’s preferences to preserve second stochastic dominance, a more
stringent condition on the distortion function is required (Quiggin, 1993):
The operator H() preserves second stochastic dominance on X
⇔ h is a convex function.
(16)
Thus, in the dual theory of choice, risk aversion is closely related to the convexity of
the distortion function. To better understand the effect of the distortion function, rewrite
equation (13) as:
H(X) =
∫ ∞
0
xh′(SX(x))fX(x)dx = E[Xh
′(SX(x))], (17)
where fX is the probability density of X. Because h is convex, its first derivative h
′ is an
increasing function and thus h′(SX(x)) is decreasing in x, i.e. h
′(SX(x)) becomes small
for large values of the random variable X. We can thus regard h′(SX(x)) as a weighting
mechanism which discounts the probability of desirable events (high X), while loading
the probability of adverse events (low X). In expected utility theory risk aversion is
induced by exaggerating the effects of adverse events; in the dual theory this is done by
exaggerating their probability.
To give a measure of risk aversion in the dual theory of choice, we define the uncer-
tainty aversion coefficient, which is a dual to the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient of
utility theory:
ua(w) =
h′′(s)
h′(s)
(18)
Examples of probability distortion functions are the dual power distortion (which has
increasing uncertainty aversion):
h(s) = 1− (1− s)q, 0 < q ≤ 1 ⇒ ua(s) = (1− q)(1− s)−1, (19)
and the exponential distortion function (which has constant uncertainty aversion):
h(s) =
eβs − 1
eβ − 1
, β > 0 ⇒ ua(s) = β. (20)
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2.5 Generalised expected utility
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory and Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice
are complementary approaches. In fact, Yaari presented his theory less as a complete
characterisation of agents’ preferences but more as an illustrative example of preference
functionals and orderings alternative to the ones produced by expected utility.
We can actually produce a comprehensive description of an economic agent’s prefer-
ences by combining the two above-mentioned approaches. (A rigorous axiomatic charac-
terisation of such preferences is given by Schmeidler (1989), while the book by Quiggin
(1993) is also dedicated to the subject). Thus, we equip our agent with both a utility u
and a probability distortion h. This yields the generalised expected utility operator:
Vu,h(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h(Su(X)(x))− 1)dx +
∫ ∞
0
h(Su(X)(x))dx (21)
The preference functional Vu,h represents expected utility, calculated under a distorted
probability distribution.
In the context of generalised utility theory, second stochastic dominance gives us again
a clue about the shape of the utility and distortion functions. The preference functional
Vu,h preserves second stochastic dominance if and only if the utility function u is concave
and the distortion function h is convex (Quiggin, 1993). These two conditions will be
standing assumptions for the rest of this paper.
3 Risk measures and their properties
3.1 Definition of risk measures
Risk measures are defined as functions that take as arguments random variables, which
represent the terminal value of assets and/or liabilities at a fixed later date. Risk measures
return a real number which encapsules the risk assessment of the portfolio, whose random
value is used as an argument. The output of the risk measure represents the amount of
additional capital that the holder of the portfolio must add to his position in order that
a regulator or a rating agency or indeed the agent himself deems the aggregate position
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acceptable (this definition is due to Artzner et al. (1999)). Formally, a risk measure ρ
is defined as a real valued functional on a collection of portfolios X . Hence the holder
of the risky investment X has to keep an amount ρ(X) safely invested (for simplicity, in
our paper this means with zero interest). The higher the risk assessment (as produced
by the risk measure) of the position X, the more will the capital be that the agent has
to reserve.
3.2 Risk measures and premium principles
Risk measures are in many respects akin to actuarial premium calculations principles.
For an insurance carrier exposed to a liability X, a premium calculation principle Π gives
the minimum amount Π(X) that the insurer must raise from the insured in order that
it is in his interest to proceed with the contract. Thus a premium calculation principle
can be directly interpreted as a risk measure. A notational issue emerges here, because
in the actuarial literature insurance liabilities are usually denoted by positive random
variables, while in the more general risk management literature liabilities are denoted by
negative variables. In order not to contradict either convention, we will use the notation
Π(X) = ρ(−X) for a premium calculation principle and the associated risk measure. The
relation between risk measures and premium calculation principles is further discussed in
section 4.1.
3.3 Properties of risk measures
Before discussing specific classes of risk measures emerging from the three theories of
choice examined in the previous sections, we give a brief exposition of possible (sets of)
desirable properties that risk measures and the associated premium principles should
satisfy.
A first natural requirement that we can impose on a risk measure is that a portfolio
whose value at the end of one period is always higher than that of another, should also
induce lower capital requirements. This property, monotonicity, can be summarised as:
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Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y almost surely, then ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y )
(Note that in terms of premium calculation principles, monotonicity is expressed as
Π(X) ≤ Π(Y ) for X ≤ Y .)
Recall that a risk measure has been defined as a function giving the amount of safely
invested capital that the holder of a risk position has to add to his position, in order
to make it acceptable. Then it is obvious that, should the investor add a cash amount
to his position, the risk of the aggregate should be reduced by an equal amount. This
consideration induces the translation invariance property of risk measures:
Translation Invariance: If a ∈ R then ρ(X + a) = ρ(X)− a
(In terms of premium calculation principles translation invariance is expressed as Π(X −
a) = Π(X)− a.)
The behaviour of a risk measure with respect to the aggregation of risky positions,
manifested by the award of diversification discounts or the imposition of penalties, is
crucial. The question can be posed as follows: given two portfolios X and Y and their
joint probability distribution, how does the risk of the aggregate, ρ(X +Y ), relate to the
risks of the individual positions, ρ(X) and ρ(Y )?
The answer to this question might be related to the way in which X and Y stochasti-
cally depend on each other. Let us now present some well-known notions (e.g. Joe, 1997)
of dependence that we will refer to in this section. A useful characterisation of positive
dependence is positive quadrant dependence (PQD). Two risks X, Y are PQD whenever:
P(X ≤ x and Y ≤ y) ≥ P(X ≤ x)P(Y ≤ y), ∀x, y ∈ R (22)
Essentially two risks being PQD means that their probability of assuming low (or high)
values simultaneously is higher than it would be, were they independent. The negative
analogue of PQD is negative quadrant dependence (NQD):
P(X ≤ x and Y ≤ y) ≤ P(X ≤ x)P(Y ≤ y), ∀x, y ∈ R (23)
Finally, comonotonicity is defined as the strongest possible form of positive dependence.
Two random variables X, Y are called comonotonic if there is a random variable U and
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non-decreasing functions g, h such that:
X = g(U), Y = h(U) (24)
We now return to the issue of defining suitable aggregation properties for risk mea-
sures. Few would disagree with the claim that if the positions X and Y are negatively
related, then to some extent the one risk is a hedge for the other and, if X and Y are
pooled, this fact should be acknowledged with a reduction in risk capital. Thus, a risk
measure should be subadditive for NQD risks:
Subadditivity for NQD risks: If X, Y are NQD, then ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y )
Opinions are divided as to what should happen when positive dependence occurs. On
the one hand one could argue (as Dhaene et al. (2003) do extensively) that aggregating
positively dependent risks actually increases the riskiness of the portfolio and that this
should induce higher capital requirements. Thus, in addition to subadditivity for NQD
risks we could require:
Superadditivity for PQD risks: If X, Y are PQD, then ρ(X + Y ) ≥ ρ(X) + ρ(Y )
and
Additivity for independent risks: If X, Y are independent, then ρ(X+Y ) = ρ(X)+
ρ(Y ).
A different school of thought, represented by Wang et al. (1997) and Artzner et al.
(1999) holds that risk measures should be subadditive for any dependence structure:
Subadditivity: ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) for any X,Y ∈ X
The argument for subadditivity is that even positively dependent risks provide some
diversification, so there is no reason that capital requirements should be increased. From
a regulatory perspective Artzner et al. (1999) argue that there should be no incentives
for investors to split their portfolios, which would be the result of superadditive risk
measurement.
In a subadditive risk measure, positive dependence can be acknowledged by requiring
that for comonotonic risks it becomes additive:
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Additivity for comonotonic risks: If X, Y are comonotonic, then ρ(X+Y ) = ρ(X)+
ρ(Y ).
That is equivalent to saying that, since perfect positive dependence means that pooling
X and Y does not produce any diversification, there is no reason for the risk measure to
be subadditive.
Artzner et al. (1999) proposed the further requirement of positive homogeneity on a
risk measure:
Positive Homogeneity: If a ∈ R+ then ρ(aX) = aρ(X)
The interpretation that they gave for this property was the fairly uncontroversial state-
ment that a change in units of measurement (e.g. currency) should not result in a change
in capital requirements. However, positive homogeneity can also be understood in a dif-
ferent way: that changes in the size of an agent’s portfolio, given that its composition
is unchanged, should only effect a proportional change in capital requirements. Such an
assertion has not been without critics, see for example Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002a) and
Dhaene et al. (2003). The criticism can be summarised in the observation that positive
homogeneity does not account for liquidity risk. Positive homogeneity does not acknowl-
edge that very large portfolios of risks might produce very high losses that in turn can
make it difficult for the holder of the portfolio to raise enough cash in order to meet his
obligations. Note that positive homogeneity is consistent with comonotonic additivity,
while being contradictory to superadditivity for PQD risks.
A relaxation of positive homogeneity and subadditivity has been proposed by Fo¨llmer
and Schied (2002a), who replaced both properties with the requirement for convexity :
Convexity: ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ X , λ ∈ [0, 1]
Convexity has the interpretation of reduction in risk brought about by diversification,
while not implying the insensitivity to risk aggregation and liquidity risk brought about
by the combination of subadditivity and positive homogeneity.
We conclude with some terminology. Risk measures that satisfy monotonicity, trans-
lation invariance, subadditivity and positive homogeneity are called coherent (Artzner et
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al., 1999). If additivity for comonotonic risks is added to these properties we end up with
a specific sub-class of coherent risk measures, called distortion premium principles (Wang
(1996), Wang et al. (1997)). On the other hand risk measures satisfying monotonicity,
translation invariance and convexity are called convex (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2002a). Fi-
nally, risk measures that are additive for independent risks are called additive (Gerber,
1974).
4 Risk measures induced by theories of choice
4.1 Risk measures and indifference arguments
Risk measures provide in some sense an ordering of portfolios with random payoffs, in
terms of their riskiness. In this section we will be concerned with the way in which such
an ordering can be associated with the preference orderings stemming from theories of
choice that were discussed previously. In other words, given a risk measure ρ we are
interested in preference functionals V such that:
ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) ⇔ V (X) ≥ V (Y ), ∀X,Y ∈ X (25)
A relation such as the above emerges when producing risk measures from preference
functionals, via indifference arguments. Such a process can be simply explained through
the example of pricing and insurance contract. In an insurance context an interpretation
of risk measures is as premium calculation mechanisms. The premium Π(X) that an
insurer asks for insuring a liability −X, should be equal to the capital ρ(−X) that
the insurer has then to reserve in order to remain insolvent.1 Consider now an insurer
with initial surplus (cash) w, who insures a liability −X. The insurer’s preferences are
described by a preference functional V : X 7→ R, such as the ones encountered in section
2. The premium Π(X) that the insurer will charge, can be determined via an indifference
1This is of course a simplified version of reality. We are not concerned here with the more realistic
case where the insurer invests the premium in, say, stocks, thus achieving a higher return but being
exposed to new sources of risk.
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argument, i.e. it should be the sum for which it is indifferent to the insurer whether
to go ahead with the contract or not. Such indifference can be formalised by requiring
that evaluations of the preference functional before and after the contract yield the same
result:
V (w) = V (w −X + Π(X)) (26)
The premium Π(X) will then be obtained as a solution to the above equation. As
discussed above, a risk measure can then be defined as:
ρ(X) = Π(−X) ∀X ∈ X (27)
From now on, whenever the relationship (27) holds, we will call Π the premium cal-
culation principle associated with the risk measure ρ and vice versa. The minus sign
essentially comes from the fact that in premium calculation positive outcomes are gen-
erally considered to be losses, while in the more general framework of risk measurement
positive values of the portfolio denote gains.
In sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 we show how classes of premium principles (and the
associated risk measures), satisfying alternative sets of properties, can be derived from
the economic theories of choice discussed earlier. The comparison between these premium
principles is summarised in the Appendix B.
4.2 Risk measures derived from expected utility
4.2.1 Zero-utility premium calculation
In this section we consider agents whose preferences conform to the the theory of expected
utility discussed in section 2.3. Consider an insurer with a utility function u and initial
surplus w, who prices a liability −X. The indifference argument (26) now becomes:
u(w) = E[u(w −X + Πu(X))] (28)
If w is set to zero, the above equation becomes:
u(0) = E[u(−X + Πu(X))] (29)
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The premium calculation principle Πu() that emerges as the solution of (29, is called
the principle of zero utility (Bu¨hlmann, 1970). Note that the zero-utility principle is
monotonic and translation invariant, as a direct result of equation (29). Moreover, all
zero-utility principles associated with concave utility functions are consistent with the
ordering of risks according to second stochastic dominance, as discussed in section 2.3.
Equation (29) has in general no analytical solution. However in the special case of a
quadratic utility function (10), a solution does exist:
Πuq(X) = E[X] + c−
√
c2 − σ2(X), (30)
which for small values of the variance σ2(X) ≪ c can be approximated by (Bu¨hlmann,
1970):
Πuq(X) ≃ E[X] +
σ2
2c
. (31)
This premium calculation principle is termed the variance principle.
4.2.2 The exponential premium principle
A very interesting premium principle emerges when the utility function is of the exponen-
tial type (11). Then equation (28) yields the following solution (the exponential utility
function’s constant risk aversion makes the initial surplus irrelevant and we do not need
to set it to zero):
Πuexp(X) =
1
a
ln E[eaX ], a ∈ (0,∞) (32)
(where it is understood that for a = 0 the premium principle reduces to the net premium,
Πuexp|a=0(X) = E[X]). This premium calculation mechanism is called the exponential
premium principle and has been proposed by several authors, see for example Gerber
(1974), Bu¨hlmann (1985). The risk measure associated with the exponential premium
principle is:
ρuexp(X) =
1
a
ln E[e−aX ] (33)
Some important properties of the exponential premium principle and the associated
risk measure are (Gerber (1974), Dhaene et al. (2003)):
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• Monotonicity
• Translation invariance
• Subadditivity for negatively related (NQD) risks
• Additive for independent risks
• Superadditivity for positively related (PQD) risks
The last two properties imply that the aggregation of positively dependent investment
positions increases the risk of the portfolio superlinearly. Note that this implies that the
premium principle and associated risk measure is not positively homogenous. Thus the
exponential premium principle is sensitive to the liquidity risk and aggregation issues
discussed in section 3.3. These properties are a direct result of the association with
expected utility theory, since an increase in the scale of losses would lead to a steeper
than linear reduction in utility. We also note that the exponential premium principle
(with the net premium as a special case) is the only zero-utility premium principle that
is additive for independent risks (Gerber, 1974).
We consider, however, the properties of the exponential principle as being excessively
strict, as far as relatively small portfolios are concerned. The superadditivity for positively
related risks is present even for very small portfolios, where liquidity risk and aggregation
are not of primary importance. Furthermore, for small portfolios the exponential principle
will approximately equal the net premium and thus no safety loading will be produced.
4.2.3 Exponential premium principle and ruin theory
An alternative interpretation of the exponential premium principle can be given in terms
of ruin theory, see for example Bu¨hlmann (1985). Consider an insurer with an initial
surplus S0. Each year t the insurer is exposed to stochastic insurance losses Xt and has
a premium income ct. Thus the insurer’s surplus process is:
St = St−1 + ct −Xt, t = 1, 2, ... (34)
Risk Measures and Theories of Choice 20
Assume now that the annual total claims Xt, t = 1, 2, ... are identically and independently
distributed. Denote as X a random variable with the same distribution as Xt. Let the
premium ct be given by premium principle Π, i.e. ct = Π(Xt). Since the liabilities Xt
have same distribution each year, each year’s premium will also be the same, so that
ct = c = Π(X).
Ruin is defined as St becoming negative at some time t > 0. Denote the probability of
ruin as ψ. The question posed now is: given the premium calculation principle Π, what
is the probability of ruin? A similar question is: can we control the probability of ruin
by choosing an appropriate risk measure? Assuming that X has exponentially bounded
tails, the probability of ruin, ψ, is bounded by:
ψ ≤ e−λS0 , (35)
where λ is called the ‘adjustment coefficient’ and is the solution of the equation:
eλc = E[eλX ], (36)
which in turn yields:
c =
1
λ
ln E[eλX ] (37)
Thus, calculating premium by the exponential principle with a risk aversion coefficient
of λ, introduces an upper bound of e−λS0 on the probability of ruin. It can be seen that
the higher λ is, the lower the probability of ruin. This relation can be interpreted as a
specific upper bound on the probability of ruin implying a risk aversion parameter for
the insurer and vice versa. It is also important that the probability of ruin depends on
the initial surplus; the lower that is, the more likely ruin becomes.
4.3 Risk measures derived from the dual theory of choice
4.3.1 The distortion premium principle
Here we repeat the indifference argument of section 4.1 for the case that preferences
are modelled by the dual theory of choice under risk that was discussed in 2.4. Thus,
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risk aversion is induced by an increasing convex probability distortion function h and
the resulting preference functional is of the form (12). The indifference argument (26)
becomes:
Hh(w) = Hh(w −X + Πh(X)) (38)
This equation can be explicitly solved for the premium Πh:
Πh(X) = −Hh(−X) = −
{∫ 0
−∞
(h(S−X(x))− 1)dx +
∫ ∞
0
h(S−X(x))dx
}
(39)
and the corresponding risk measure is:
ρh(X) = −Hh(X) = −
{∫ 0
−∞
(h(SX(x))− 1)dx +
∫ ∞
0
h(SX(x))dx
}
(40)
We can rewrite equation (39) in the simpler form:
Πh(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(g(SX(x))− 1)dx +
∫ ∞
0
g(SX(x))dx, (41)
where g(s) = 1−h(1−s) is called the conjugate distortion function of h. When the liability
X is strictly positive, we end up with only the second term in the above equation, which
was introduced in the context of insurance pricing by Denneberg (1990) and Wang (1996)
and is often known as the distortion premium principle.
It can be shown (Denneberg (1990), Wang et al. (1997)) that, whenever h is convex
(equivalently g is concave), the distortion premium principle satisfies the following five
key properties:
• Monotonicity
• Translation invariance
• Positive homogeneity
• Subadditivity
• Additivity for comonotonic risks
The first four of these properties ensure that the distortion principle is a coherent risk
measure in the sense of Artzner et al. (1999), while comonotonic additivity is a desirable
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attribute for a subadditive risk measure, as already discussed in 3.3. Furthermore, it
can be shown that every premium principle (risk measure) that satisfies the five proper-
ties above can be represented as a distortion premium principle, subject to a technical
condition (Wang et al., 1997).
Note that because of its association with the dual theory of choice, the distortion
premium principle is also consistent with second stochastic dominance. The association
with the dual theory is also the reason behind the property of positive homogeneity. It
was seen in section 2.4 that the under the dual theory the agents are risk neutral with
respect to the absolute size of potential losses or gains, since the distortion function affects
only the probabilities of adverse events. Thus, positive homogeneity is a consequence of
the linearity in wealth that the dual theory implies. This makes the distortion principle
insensitive to liquidity risk and risk aggregation.
4.3.2 Probability distortion and sets of measures
We conclude with another representation of distortion premium principles, via sets of
probability measures. A probability measure Q : F 7→ R is a real-valued set function
defined on the collection (σ-algebra) of events F that assigns a probability to each of
those events. Denote as P the ‘real-world’ or ‘actuarial’ probability measure and as
EQ[X] the expected value of X with respect to the measure Q. Then the distortion
premium principle (39) and the corresponding risk measure can be written as:
Πh(X) = sup
Q∈Qg
EQ[X] = − inf
Q∈Qh
EQ[−X] (42)
and
ρh(X) = sup
Q∈Qg
EQ[−X] = − inf
Q∈Qh
EQ[X], (43)
where the sets of probability measures Qg, Qh are defined as:
Qg = {Q : Q(A) ≤ g(P(A)), ∀A ∈ F}
Qh = {Q : Q(A) ≥ h(P(A)), ∀A ∈ F}
(44)
The representation (42) can be interpreted as the expected loss EQ[X] of X, under the
‘worst possible’ measure in Qg. The measures Q are sometimes called ‘generalised scenar-
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ios’ (Artzner et al., 1999). Thus the distortion premium principle can be re-interpreted as
a ‘worst-scenario’ approach to calculating expected loss, over the appropriate set of risk
adjusted test probabilities. On the other hand, we can consider the presence of a set of
probability measures as a way of quantifying uncertainty with respect to the distribution
function of the underlying risk (Schmeidler, 1989). The extent of such uncertainty is
determined by the concavity of g (convexity of h) through which the set of measures Qg
(Qh) is defined.
4.4 Generalised expected utility and convex measures of risk
It is an obvious step to now synthesize the two approaches for producing risk measures
that were shown in the previous two sections. We assume that an agent’s preferences are
summarised by both a concave utility u and a convex distortion h. Thus the indifference
argument (26) takes the form:
Vu,h(w) = Vu,h(w −X + Πu,h(X)) (45)
As the premium principle Πu,h emerges from generalised expected utility, it inherits
properties both from expected utility and the dual theory of choice. It is thus easily
understood that, as discussed by Luan (2001), in the case of a linear utility function the
distortion principle is obtained as a special case, while, in the case of a linear probability
distortion (and w = 0) Πu,h reduces to the zero-utility principle. In general, the properties
of Πu,h will lie somewhere in between those of these two extreme cases, however its
precise behaviour is difficult to pin down. It is in general difficult to determine at which
point the utility or the distortion function will have the most influence (Quiggin, 1993).
One important property is that it is consistent with second order stochastic dominance,
whenever u is concave and h is convex (Quiggin, 1993). A very useful characterisation
has been given by Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002b), who have shown in a slightly different
context, that risk measures emerging from indifference arguments such as (45) are in
fact convex measures of risk. Thus the premium principle Πu,h and the associated risk
measure ρu,h(X) = Πu,h(−X) are monotonic, translation invariant and convex.
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5 A distortion-exponential premium principle
In this section we propose a premium principle (and the corresponding risk measure),
which is obtained as a special case of the risk measures considered in section 4.4 when an
exponential utility function is used. This premium principle is mathematically tractable,
while having quite interesting properties, and we call it the distortion-exponential prin-
ciple.
5.1 Definition
Reconsider equation (45), with an exponential utility function, uexp, and an arbitrary dis-
tortion function h. As seen in section 4.2, calculations involving exponential utilities are
much easier and tend to yield explicit solutions. Then the premium principle Πuexp,h(X),
which we may call the distortion-exponential principle becomes:
Πuexp,h(X) =
1
a
ln
{∫ 0
−∞
(g(SeaX (x))− 1)dx +
∫ ∞
0
g(SeaX (x))dx
}
, (46)
where g(s) = 1− h(1− s) is the (concave) conjugate distortion function. The associated
risk measure can be defined by Πuexp,h(−X).
We note that the distortion-exponential principle can be concisely represented via the
set of probability measures Qg (44):
Πuexp,h(X) =
1
a
ln
{
sup
Q∈Qg
EQ[e
aX ]
}
(47)
Now we can rewrite the above equation as:
Πuexp,H(X) = sup
Q∈Qg
{
1
a
ln EQ[e
aX ]
}
= sup
Q∈Qg
Πuexp(X) (48)
Thus the distortion-exponential principle is interpreted as an exponential premium prin-
ciple, evaluated with respect to the worst-case probability measure in Qg. If we interpret
the set of scenarios Qg as quantifying the uncertainty regarding the probability distri-
bution of a portfolio X, the above representation can be viewed as being derived from
the ruin problem discussed in section 4.2. Thus, the distortion-exponential principle pro-
vides a mechanism for controlling the probability of ruin, in the presence of distributional
uncertainty, modelled via distorted probabilities.
Risk Measures and Theories of Choice 25
5.2 Properties
As the distortion-exponential principle emerges from generalised expected utility, it inher-
its properties both from the exponential premium principle and risk measures based on
distorted probabilities. Thus, the properties of this composite risk measure will lie some-
where between these two extremes of economic behaviour. As discussed in the previous
section, the distortion-exponential principle and the associated risk measure satisfy:
• Monotonicity
• Translation invariance
• Convexity
It is easily seen that the exponential and distortion principles obtained in the previous
two sections are special cases of this more general premium principle. Thus, if we let the
utility function become linear (i.e. let the risk aversion coefficient tend to zero), then
convexity breaks down into positive homogeneity and subadditivity, and we obtain a
coherent risk measure. On the other hand, if the distortion function is linear, convexity
reaches its other extreme and can be substituted by additivity for independent risks,
subadditivity for NQD risks and superadditivity for PQD ones.
5.3 Comparison of the distortion-exponential to the distortion
and exponential principles
In the case that neither the utility nor the distortion function is linear, whether the
properties of the proposed risk measure are closer to the exponential or the distortion
principle will to some extent depend on the underlying risks that are examined. Consider
an insurance liability with loss ratio X ≥ 0, and an insurance company holding λ units
of the liability, i.e. being exposed to risk λX. Note that the effect of the exponential
function in (46), will then depend on the product aλ. When λ is small in relation to
a, then the aggregate effect is that the exponential term will be very similar to a linear
one. Thus, we can claim that for small portfolios, the distortion-exponential principle
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becomes asymptotically equivalent to the corresponding distortion principle and inherits
its properties. Thus, for small portfolios, the distortion-exponential principle will be
positively homogenous and subadditive. However, for higher values of λ the exponential
term grows and we would expect the effect of the utility function to become prevalent.
5.3.1 Sensitivity to portfolio size
The main criticism against positive homogeneity is that it disregards liquidity risk. How-
ever for small portfolios liquidity risk can be negligible, hence it is reasonable to require
that for such portfolios the risk measure becomes approximately invariant to the scale of
potential losses. The influence of the exponential utility function on the risk assessment
of portfolios with variable sizes is illustrated in figures 1 and 2. We assume X is Gamma
distributed with mean equal to 1 and variance equal to 0.2. First we consider the case of
a linear distortion function and an exponential utility with risk aversion ra = 0.5 · 10−6.
The corresponding risk assessment of λX for 0 < λ ≤ 5 · 106, given by the exponential
premium principle is shown in figure 1, along with the expected loss (net premium) of
λX. It can be seen that for small values of λ the two lines are almost indistinguishable,
while when λ becomes comparable to 1/a, the line representing risk assessment with
the exponential premium principle starts to diverge. Thus, risk aversion only starts to
‘kick-in’ when the size of the portfolio is such that a potential loss becomes a significant
threat to the liability holder’s solvency. For small values of λ the line corresponding to
the exponential premium principle is approximately straight, which can be interpreted
as (approximate) positive homogeneity (scale invariance) at that level. However, the fact
that for small λ the exponential principle gives the same values as the net premium is
something that one could disagree with, as it implies that for small portfolios no safety
loading is necessary.
This weakness is rectified if we use instead of the exponential premium the distortion-
exponential principle, where an exponential distortion function, with uncertainty aversion
ua = 4, is used. In figure 2 the behaviour of the distortion-exponential principle with
respect to portfolio size is depicted, along with risk assessments produced with the corre-
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sponding distortion principle and expected loss. It can be seen that for small portfolios
the risk given by distortion-exponential principle is asymptotically the same as the one
calculated with the distortion principle, thus it is again approximately positively ho-
mogenous. On the other hand positive homogeneity does not imply here the absence of
a safety loading, as is seen by the different slopes of the straight lines corresponding to
the distortion principle and the expected loss. A safety loading even for small portfo-
lios is the result of the uncertainty aversion introduced by the distortion function, while,
when the exponential utility’s non-linear effect becomes significant, an additional loading
is present, resulting from the sensitivity to very high potential losses. Thus, with the
distortion-exponential principle we get the best of both worlds: positive homogeneity for
small portfolios, a proportional safety loading for all portfolio sizes, plus a non-linear
loading for large portfolios that pose an increased liquidity risk.
5.3.2 Sensitivity to risk aggregation
We now turn our attention to the issue of risk aggregation. As discussed previously, the
distortion principle is insensitive to risk aggregation issues, as it is always subadditive.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the exponential premium principle is over-
sensitive to risk aggregation since it is superadditive for all PQD risk, even for small
ones, and thus makes no acknowledgement of the possible diversification implicit in risk
pooling (in fact using the exponential principle would create an incentive to split even
the smallest portfolio of positively related risks). Consider two random liabilities, X and
Y . Given a premium principle Π, we define the relative saving from pooling, γ(X,Y ), as
the proportional reduction in premium (risk capital) when X and Y are pooled:
γ(X,Y ) =
Π(X) + Π(Y )− Π(X + Y )
Π(X) + Π(Y )
(49)
If X and Y are positively related (PQD to be more precise), for a distortion principle
γ(X,Y ) will always be positive, due to subadditivity, and for an exponential principle
it will be always negative, due to superadditivity. As discussed before, neither of those
two extremes is satisfactory, since the former disregards risk aggregation, while the latter
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does not acknowledge diversification.
Again, the distortion-exponential principle occupies the middle ground and provides
an answer that is in our view satisfactory. Let X and Y be Gamma distributed, both
with mean 0.5 and variance 0.05, and positively dependent with correlation 0.5 (in this
example we use a Gaussian copula (Joe, 1997) to model dependence). In figure 3 we
plot γ(λX, λY ) as a function of λ for the distortion principle, the exponential principle,
and the distortion-exponential principle. It can be seen that, as expected, the savings
from pooling are always positive for the distortion principle and always negative for the
exponential principle. For the distortion-exponential principle the savings are positive
for small λ and negative for large ones; the point that the line crosses the x-axis is the
one when the dangers from risk aggregation become more significant than the benefits
from risk pooling.
Overall, the properties of the risk measure that we introduced in this paper lie between
those of the exponential and distortion premium principles. For small portfolios it behaves
like a coherent risk measure, while for larger ones, where liquidity risk and risk aggregation
become significant, the exponential function progressively introduces superlinearity and
superadditivity in the risk assessment. The definition of what a large portfolio is will
depend on the specific situation and preferences of its holder and can be controlled by
modifying the risk aversion parameter of the exponential function.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we discussed alternative theories of choice and the properties of risk
measures that are associated with those theories. Our purpose has been to show that
these two complementary perspectives of the problem of risk measurement illuminate
each other. Thus risk measures resulting from expected utility theory are sensitive to the
relative scale of potential losses, which is a direct result of the non-linearity of the utility
function. We focused on the case of exponential utility functions, as the resulting risk
measures, called exponential premium principles, are characterised by a transparent set
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of properties, while also having an interesting interpretation in terms the classical ruin
problem. The exponential premium principle has been shown to be particularly sensitive
to risk aggregation. On the other hand, coherent risk measures derived from the dual
theory of choice, called distortion principles, have been shown to be insensitive to risk
aggregation, as they are subadditive for all risks. However, for small portfolios of risks,
where liquidity and aggregation issues are less prevalent, distortion principles both ap-
ply a proportional safety loading and acknowledge diversification, which the exponential
principle fails to do.
Thus we see that the two complementary theories of choice, expected utility and the
dual theory, induce classes of risk measures that have complementary sets properties,
none of which are completely satisfactory. These arguments imply that a desirable set
of properties of a risk measure would lie somewhere in between those of coherent risk
measures, on the one side, and the exponential principle, on the other. Our discussion
thus contributes to the criticism of coherent risk measures initiated by Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002a, 2002b) and Dhaene et al. (2003). Generalised utility theory, which combines
expected utility and the dual theory, gives rise to a different class of convex measures of
risk. Using again an exponential utility function, we obtain a risk measure (which we term
the distortion-exponential principle) with properties that we believe are satisfactory. This
risk measure behaves approximately as a coherent risk measure for smaller portfolios of
risks, while for larger portfolios the risk aversion induced by the utility function becomes
prevalent and the sensitivity to liquidity and risk aggregation issues gradually increases.
That this increase is gradual is in our view a very positive feature, as the alternative
would be to define a cut-off point in portfolio size, whose relative arbitrariness could
create anomalies in risk management policy.
We observe that the theory of choice which arguably gives the most complete char-
acterisation of agent preferences, generalised expected utility, also induces risk measures
with what we believe to be the best properties. This indicates that the association of risk
measures with economic theories has been a productive approach and constitutes more
than a theoretical exercise. We must however note that, even though generalised expected
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utility improves on the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory, it is also sometimes vi-
olated in practice (Fennema and Wakker (1996), Georgantzis et al. (2002)). A question
then arises as to whether, in the presence of these violations, our analysis retains its
validity. Economic theories of choice strive to give mathematical descriptions of rational-
ity, but what happens when individual decision makers do not conform with prescribed
notions of what a rational act is? We believe that such contradictions do not invalidate
the usefulness of the theoretical tools that we used. At the level of policy making one
is actually in the position to consciously decide as to what a rational decision is; the
operation of risk measures is by definition normative rather than descriptive. Regulation
tries to strike a balance between how market players should act and how they are actually
likely to act and we believe that risk measures derived from generalised expected utility
get this balance about right. On the other hand, decisions violating economic theories
of choice do not necessarily imply irrationality, but are often due to other factors, which
cannot be easily quantified. It is not the function of a risk measure to negate these
factors; an economic decision should not depend exclusively on the value returned by a
mathematical model. However, the presence of a risk measure provides decision-makers
with one additional conceptual tool, serving a specific purpose. It is then a matter of best
practice to choose this tool carefully and justify that choice via economic arguments.
The preceding discussion does not suggest how the risk measures that we propose
should be calibrated. Calibration would of course depend of the context in which the
risk measure will be used. If it is used as regulatory requirement imposed on the market,
the uncertainty aversion of the distortion function could be indicated by a regulator.
Recall that the distortion function can be interpreted as a mechanism for producing
probabilistic scenarios. This bears some similarity with the Value-at-Risk methodology
currently employed in banking regulation. On the other hand, if the risk measure is
used internally by a financial entity (bank, insurance company, corporation), the decision
would depend on the risk manager’s view. Regarding the calibration of the (exponential)
utility function, the classical insurer’s ruin problem discussed earlier in the paper, without
being necessarily valid in a general risk management context, provides some insight. It
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was seen that the risk aversion parameter depends on the initial surplus of the insurer, as
well as the maximum acceptable probability of ruin. As our motivation for employing an
exponential utility function was related to the issue of how to treat large portfolios, it is
reasonable to expect the definition of what amounts to a large portfolio to be dependent on
the financial size of its holder. The implication is that the calibration of the risk measure
is a company-specific issue. We do not consider this as a weakness of the proposed
methodology. Different market players have different characteristics and priorities, and
the mathematical tools they use should be flexible enough to cater for this simple fact.
Furthermore, the imposition by a regulator of a single risk measure on the whole market
has been criticised in the literature (Danielson et al., 2001) as a source of systemic risk,
as the use by all market agents of the same risk measure would result in similar risk
management strategies. This would in turn increase the homogeneity of market decision
makers and increase the probability of a systemic crisis.
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A Theories of choice under risk: Axiomatic
characterisations
For each theory of choice discussed in the paper, the corresponding preference func-
tional can be derived from a set of axioms. In this section we briefly present such ax-
iomatisations, without going into great mathematical detail and the precise conditions
under which the representation theorems hold. It is significant that the sets of axioms
characterising alternative theories of choice differ with respect to the way they deal with
aggregation of risks. It is thus no coincidence that the risk measures induced by these
theories also have different properties relating to the risk assessment of sums of risks (i.e.
superadditivity, subadditivity, convexity). Note that alternative axiomatisations are pos-
sible, especially in the case of generalised expected utility. Here we follow the treatment
by Puppe (1991). We also find the discussions by Yaari (1987) and Schmeidler (1989)
very useful.
Let X be a set of random variables on a probability space (Ω,F , P). The decumulative
distribution function SX(x) of X ∈ X is defined by SX(x) = P(X > x). Denote as D
the set of decumulative distributions of elements in X . Let all elements in X take values
in a compact interval M ⊂ R, so that M is the support of distributions in D. We also
assume that D is endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
Assume a binary preference operator ‘º’ defined on D, with ‘≻’ being its asymmetric
part (strict preference) and ‘∼’ its symmetric part (indifference). The relation ‘º’ is called
complete if, ∀F,G ∈ D, F º G or G º F holds. The relation ‘º’ is called transitive
if F º G and G º H imply F º H, ∀F,G,H ∈ D. ‘º’ is called a weak order if it is
complete and transitive.
A real valued functional V : D 7→ R is a representation of ‘º’ if for all F,G ∈ D:
F º G ⇔ V (F ) ≥ V (G)
Consider the following axioms on ‘º’:
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Weak Order The relation ‘º’ is a weak order, i.e. preferences are complete and transi-
tive.
Continuity ∀F ∈ D the sets {G ∈ D : G º F} and {G ∈ D : F º G} are closed in the
topology of weak convergence.
Monotonicity ∀F,G ∈ D, F ≻ G whenever F dominates G in first order stochastic
dominance, i.e. F (x) ≥ G(x) ∀x ∈ R (and the inequality is strict for at least one
x).
Independence ∀F,G,H ∈ D and a ∈ [0, 1], F º G implies aF + (1− a)H º aG + (1−
a)H.
Then the expected utility theorem can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Expected Utility). Let ‘º’ be a binary operator on D. If and only if
‘º’ satisfies the Weak Order, Continuity, Monotonicity and Independence axioms, there
exists a strictly increasing real valued function u such that ‘º’ can be represented by the
expected utility functional:
V (X) =
∫
M
u(x)d(1− SX(x)) = E[u(X)]
Moreover the utility function u is unique up to affine transformations.
Note that the Independence axiom is responsible for the linearity in probabilities of the
expected utility functional. Furthermore, Independence has been found to be frequently
violated in practice. Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice, emerges by modifying the
Independence axiom. Let SX ⊕ SY denote the decumulative distribution function of
X + Y . Consider now the following axiom:
Dual Independence ∀F,G,H ∈ D and a ∈ [0, 1], F º G implies aF ⊕ (1 − a)H º
aG⊕ (1− a)H.
The following result holds:
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Theorem 2 (Yaari). Let ‘º’ be a binary operator on D. If and only if ‘º’ satisfies
the Weak Order, Continuity, Monotonicity and Dual Independence axioms, there exists
a unique continuous and strictly increasing function h : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] such that ‘º’ can
be represented by the functional:
V (X) =
∫
M∩R
−
(h(SX(x))− 1)dx +
∫
M∩R+
h(SX(x))dx
Dual Independence is responsible for the linearity in payoffs observed in the dual
theory of choice. In order to obtain a generalised utility functional depending on both
a utility and a distortion function, the Independence axiom has to be weakened and
not just modified. There are several ways of doing this and some additional conditions
are needed so we will not state a theorem for that case. Sets of alternative axioms are
discussed in Puppe (1991), while a very interesting approach is that of Schmeidler (1989).
He substituted Independence with:
Comonotonic Independence For all pairwise comonotonic F,G,H ∈ D and a ∈ (0, 1),
F º G implies aF + (1− a)H º aG + (1− a)H.
The resulting preference functional is an expected utility under a non-additive probability
measure (Denneberg, 1994), which under some technical conditions can be represented
as a distorted probability.
B Summary of theories of choice and resulting risk measures
Economic theory Expected Utility Dual Theory of Choice Generalised Expected Utility
Nonlinear distortion of: wealth (u(x)) probability (h(P) = 1− g(1− P)) wealth and probability
Preference functional U(X) =
∫ +∞
−∞
u(x)dFX(x) H(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h(SX(x))− 1)dx Vu,h(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h(Su(X)(x))− 1)dx
+
∫∞
0
h(SX(x))dx +
∫∞
0
h(Su(X)(x))dx
Separability axiom Independence Dual independence Comonotonic independence
Exponential Distortion Distortion-Exponential
Premium principle Πuexp(X) =
1
a
ln E[eaX ] Πh(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(g(SX(x))− 1)dx Πuexp,h(X) =
1
a
ln{
∫ 0
−∞
(g(SeaX (x))− 1)dx
(using exponential utility) +
∫∞
0
g(SX(x))dx +
∫∞
0
g(SeaX (x))dx}
Premium as function superlinear linear linear for small portfolios
of portfolio size superlinear for large portfolios
Risk loading zero for small portfolios positive and constant positive for small portfolios
and increases with size and increases with size
subadditive for NQD subadditive for all risks convex
Sensitivity to aggregation additive for independent additive for comonotonic risks (subadditive for small risks,
superadditive for PQD risks superadditive for large PQD risks)
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Figure 1: Effect of portfolio size on risk assessment with the exponential premium prin-
ciple.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the effect of portfolio size on risk assessment, for the distortion
and distortion-exponential premium principles.
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Figure 3: Comparison of savings from pooling positively correlated liabilities, with the
distortion, exponential and distortion-exponential premium principles.
